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Abstract—The state-of-the-art federated learning brings a new
direction for the data privacy protection of mobile crowdsensing
machine learning applications. However, besides being vulnerable
to GAN based user data construction attack, the existing gradient
descent based federate learning schemes are lack of consideration
for how to preserve the model privacy. In this paper, we propose a
secret sharing based federated extreme boosting learning frame-
work (FedXGB) to achieve privacy-preserving model training
for mobile crowdsensing. First, a series of protocols are designed
to implement privacy-preserving extreme gradient boosting of
classification and regression tree. The protocols preserve the
user data privacy protection feature of federated learning that
XGBoost is trained without revealing plaintext user data. Then,
in consideration of the high commercial value of a well-trained
model, a secure prediction protocol is developed to protect
the model privacy for the crowdsensing sponsor. Additionally,
we operate comprehensive theoretical analysis and extensive
experiments to evaluate the security, effectiveness and efficiency
of FedXGB. The results show that FedXGB is secure in the
honest-but-curious model, and attains approximate accuracy and
convergence rate with the original model in low runtime.
Index Terms—Privacy-Preserving, Crowdsensing Applications,
Federated Learning, Extreme Boosting Learning, Secret Sharing
I. INTRODUCTION
Extreme gradient boosting learning (XGBoost) is one of
the most state-of-the-art machine learning model that per-
forms noticeably well on processing both classification and
regression tasks in applications, like malware detection [1] and
consumption behaviour prediction [2]. Its success is mainly
due to its excellent predictive performance, highly optimized
multicore, mature distributed implementation and the ability
to handle sparse data [3]. However, just like the other ma-
chine learning models, its high performance is still based
on the support of large-scale database. Building a reliable
big database usually requires the professional data analyst
to collect and analyze tens of years statistic data, whose
cost is unaffordable for most companies [4]. Thus, mobile
crowdsensing which implements data collection tasks through
volunteers becomes popular in real-world applications. One
of the most representative examples is the crowdsening based
smart recommendation service for news app [5].
For the existing mobile crowdsensing architecture, two
drawbacks are hindering its further development. One is the
limited computation power and storage space of the central
cloud server [6]. To resolve it, an ideal countermeasure is
distributed learning, yet in the framework, data are usually
owned by different parties. The high-level parties (e.g. service
provider) always collect user private data (e.g. age, income
or address) under the pretext of training machine learning
model and improving user experience. From the data security
incidents of recent years, the damages caused by this type of
privacy leakage have not been only towards individual security
or company finance, but also expanded to the national future.
For example, in 2018, the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data
incident reveals the big IT company’s secret harvest of millions
of people’s personal data to sway the country’s leadership
election [7]. Consequently, how to preserve data privacy for the
distributed learning of mobile crowdsensing becomes the other
obstacle required to overcome. Towards the above challenges,
federated learning, which groups the distributed devices and
remote cloud servers into a loose federation and allows model
training with no original user data uploaded, is proposed [8].
Nevertheless, for current federated learning architectures,
there are three serious but unattended problems.
Model Privacy. A well-trained model is the product of
massive investment. An example is that, to develop high-
performance machine learning and deep learning models,
Google pays $162 millions for “DeepMind” in 2016 1. Ex-
isting federated learning schemes usually choose to publish
newly obtained model to users or third-party cloud platforms
to continue the next round of training [9]. This means the
trained model can be stolen by users with very little expense,
like only some computation power and registration cost. And
the victim companies may lose the investment in model
training because of model privacy leakage.
User Dropout. As the mobile crowdsensing based online
learning framework, one of the most prominent features is
the instability of users. During any stage of each learning
round, there is a great chance that user dropout occurs. For the
original federated learning framework [8] and other follow-up
researches [10], the condition is not taken into full consid-
eration. Their default assumption that all users can maintain
1https://qz.com/1095833/how-much-googles-deepmind-ai-research-costs-
goog/
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2completely steady connections may make them unpractical in
applications.
Data Reconstruction Attack. Recent researches point out
that the federated learning schemes are vulnerable to GAN
based user data reconstruction attack [11]. The attack allows
the malicious server to exploit the gradient aggregation re-
sults uploaded by users, which are originally used for model
updating, to derive user data with GAN.
To address the mentioned challenges, in this paper, we
propose a secret sharing based federated extreme boosting
learning framework (FedXGB) to achieve privacy-preserving
model training for crowdsensing applications. The main con-
tributions of FedXGB are listed as follows.
• Extreme Boosting Privately. The privacy-preserving
federated extreme gradient boosting learning architecture,
FedXGB, achieves efficiently training of XGBoost model
for mobile crowdsensing without revealing user private
data to servers.
• Model privacy preservation. Considering the high com-
mercial value of the well-trained model in applications,
FedXGB develops a privacy-preserving prediction proto-
col that allows the model inference operated with key
parameters in the encrypted format.
• Robustness against dynamic user change. In FedXGB,
a full countermeasure against user dropout is proposed,
which minimums the cost lost and reserve as much
efficiency as possible.
• Provable security and low performance loss. Compre-
hensive security analysis is operated to prove the secure
of FedXGB in the honest-but-curious model. And exten-
sive experiments are operated to confirm that FedXGB
has negligible accuracy loss and high efficiency.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Notations
Some frequently-used notations of the paper are summa-
rized in Table I.
TABLE I
NOTATION TABLE
Notation Description
l(·) an arbitrary loss function with second-order derivative
gi the first-order derivative of l(·)
hi the second-order derivative of l(·)
ζu the secret share distributed to the user u
Ru the secret mask set owned by the user u
F a finite field F , e.g. Fp = Zp for some large prime p
fk the CART obtained from the k-th iteration of XGBoost
〈·〉u keys of u for signature, encryption or secret mask generation
B. Extreme Boosting Learning
Extreme boosting learning (XGBoost) is one of the most
outstanding ensemble learning methods because of its ex-
cellent performance in processing regression, classification,
and Kaggle tasks [12]. An XGBoost model is composed of
multiple classification and regression trees (CARTs), which are
trained by the gradient boosting method. For the k-th iteration,
the objective of the XGBoost is to minimize,
Lk =
n∑
i=1
l(yi, yˆ
k−1
i + fk(xi)) + Ω(fk), (1)
where n is the total number of training samples, i is the index
of each sample, and yi is the label of the i-th sample. yˆk−1i
represents the predicted label of the i-th sample at the (k−1)-
th iteration. Ω is a regularization item to avoid the over-fitting
issue, which can be expanded as:
Ω(fk) = γT +
1
2
λ
T∑
j=1
ω2j (2)
where γ and λ are two constant values. T is the number
of tree leaves and ωj represents the weight of leaf j. After
the expansion of Ω and the use of second-order Taylor
approximation, the scoring function Lˆk(fk) to measure the
quality of fk is displayed as:
Lˆk(fk) = −1
2
T∑
j=1
(
∑
i∈Ij gi)
2∑
i∈Ij hi + λ
+ γT, (3)
where Ij represents the set of training samples. According to
the score function Lˆk, we can retrieve an optimal tree for the
k-th iteration.
C. Secret Sharing
Since attackers can easily derive users’ private data by ex-
ploiting the uploaded gradients [11], the (t, n) Secret Sharing
(SS) scheme [13] is adopted in our scheme. For the (t, n) SS
scheme, a secret s is allowed to be split into n shares. s can be
recovered only if at least t random shares are provided; oth-
erwise, it cannot be obtained. The share generation algorithm
is illustrated as SS.share(s, t, n) = {(u, ζu)|u ∈ U}, in
which n represents the number of participants involved in SS
and U = {1, 2, , ..., n} is the set of participants. ζu describes
the share for each user u. To recover each secret, the Lagrange
polynomials based SS.recon({(u, [ζ]u)|u ∈ U ′}, t) is used.
It is required that U ′ ⊆ U has to contain at least t participants.
The following is a previously proposed secret sharing protocol
[14] to fulfill secure comparison in FEDXGB.
• Secure Comparison Protocol (SecCmp) [14]: Given two
sets of secret shares, SS.Share(s1, t, n) = {(u, ζ1u)|u ∈
U} and SS.Share(s2, t, n) = {(u, ζ2u)|u ∈ U}, random
shares of the comparison result SS.Share(s, t, n) =
{(u, ζu)|u ∈ U} is generated. Having at least t shares,
i.e., |U ′| > t, the secret can be recovered. If s1 >
s2, SS.Recon({(u, ζu)|u ∈ U ′}, t) = 0; otherwise,
SS.Recon({(u, ζu)|u ∈ U ′}, t) = 1.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce the learning framework of
secret sharing based federated extreme boosting FEDXGB,
illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. System Model of FEDXGB
A. System Model
FEDXGB consists of three types of entities: users U , edge
servers E , and a remote central cloud server S . Details are
presented as follows:
Users. U = {U1,U2, ...,Uθ}. Ui = {ui,1, ui,2, ..., ui,ni} is
a set of users belonging to the same domain. Users are data
generators and volunteer to participate in the crowdsensing
model training for FEDXGB.
Edge Servers. E = {e1, e2, ..., eθ}, where ei ∈ E is an
edge server. Edge servers are provided by various operators.
Each edge server provides the communication service for the
users that belong to the domain it controls. In FEDXGB, E
aggregates gradients and uploads results to S.
Central Cloud Server. According to the aggregation results
uploaded by E , S trains the model without knowing users’
private data. The trained model only belongs to S, not publicly
accessible.
B. Security Model
In FEDXGB, we use the curious-but-honest model as our
standard security model. The definition of the adversary A in
the security model is formalized as follows:
Definition 1 [15]. In a communication protocol, a legitimate
participant, A, does not deviate from the defined protocol, but
attempts to learn all possible information from the legitimately
received messages.
Any u ∈ U , e ∈ E and S can be an A with the following
abilities: 1) corrupt or collude with at most t legitimate partic-
ipants and get their inputs; 2) cannot extract the information
from the other good parties (e.g., legitimate inputs, random
seeds); 3) have limit computing power to launch attacks.
FEDXGB is required to achieve the two requirements.
• Data Privacy. e ∈ E and S are unable to learn the private
data of any u ∈ U , especially by the data reconstruction.
• Model Privacy. u ∈ U and e ∈ E are unable to learn the
key model parameters owned by S.
IV. FEDERATED EXTREME BOOSTING LEARNING
In the section, we discuss implementation details of
FEDXGB. The basic idea of FEDXGB to preserve privacy is
to implement the extreme CART boosting of XGBoost without
requiring any users’ private data. And the building of CART is
implemented by invoking the federate extreme gradient boost-
ing protocol (SecBoost). During the CART building process,
an essential operation is finding the optimal split. To achieve
privacy-preserving split finding, we propose the secure split
finding protocol (SecFind). Additionally, the secure prediction
protocol (SecPred) is designed to obtain prediction results of
the newly obtained CART without model privacy disclosure.
Finally, we discuss the robustness of FEDXGB against user
dropout in real-world applications.
A. Cryptographic Definition
Prior to introducing the details of FEDXGB, two essential
cryptographic functions are defined firstly.
1) Key Agreement: We apply three algorithms for key
agreement in FEDXGB: key setup KEY.Set, key generation
KEY.Gen, and key agreement KEY.Agr. Specifically, the
key setup algorithm, KEY.Set(`), is for setting up a public
parameter ppub. ` is a security parameter that defines the field
size of a secret sharing scheme Fp. KEY.Set(`) outputs a
quaternion ppub ← (G, p, g,H). G is an additive cyclic group
with a large prime order p and a generator g. Consider two
arbitrary users, u and v, u first applies the key generation
algorithm KEY.Gen(ppub) to generate outputs 〈k〉priu ← xu
and 〈k〉pubu ← gxu , which compose a private-public key pair
(〈k〉priu , 〈k〉pubu ). Then, u uses the key agreement algorithm
KEY.Agr(〈k〉priu , 〈k〉pubv ) to create a shared key 〈sk〉u,v ←
(gxu)xv , which is shared with v.
2) Identity Based Encryption and Signature: To ensure
secure data transmission in FEDXGB, we applied an iden-
tity based encryption algorithm and a signature algorithm
for message encryption and identity verification, respectively.
Given a key pair (〈ek〉enc, 〈ek〉dec) ←KEY.Gen or a share
key 〈ek〉enc = 〈ek〉dec ←KEY.Agr, the encryption func-
tion IDE.Enc outputs c =IDE.Enc(〈ek〉enc, t). And the
decryption function IDE.Dec recover the plaintext t by
computing t =IDE.Dec(〈ek〉dec, c). Similarly, the signa-
ture algorithms, SIG.Sign and SIG.Verf, are defined.
Given the key pair for signature (〈k〉sig, 〈k〉ver)←KEY.Gen,
SIG.Sign outputs the signature σ =SIG.Sign (〈k〉sig, t).
If SIG.Verf(〈k〉ver, t, σ) = 1, σ is proved to be valid;
otherwise, σ is invalid.
B. Secure Boosting
SecBoost completes the privacy-preserving extreme gra-
dient boosting process as shown in Protocol 1. In the protocol,
all users are orderly labeled with unique indexes 1, 2, ..., n
to identify their identities. Each of users deploys a small
local dataset Du = {(xu,1, yu,1), (xu,2, yu,2), ...}. Note that
we briefly describe the situation of sending a message M
from A to B as A ⇒ B : M . And the data exchange
between users from different domains needs edge servers to
serve as communication bridge. The overview of SecBoost
is illustrated in Fig. 2. Steps are proceeded in detail as below.
Step 1. System Setup: U , E , and S setup public param-
eters for key generation and model training. Firstly, apply
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Fig. 2. High-level Overview of SecBoost
KEY.Set(`) to setup cryptographic parameters ppub. Then,
FEDXGB is given the input space field Fq , the secret sharing
field Fp, and the publicly known XGBoost parameters includ-
ing λ, γ, loss function l(·), maximum tree depth dmax. The
trusted third party T generates a signature key 〈k〉sigu and a
corresponding verification key 〈k〉veru .
Step 2. User Selection: To minimize the cost of recovering
lost data for dropout users, SecBoost selects the more active
users to participate in the subsequent model training process.
The selection is based on some manually defined standards
such as the keeping active time, the connection stability, and
the maximum number of users. The set of selected users are
expressed as U ′ ⊂ U . Based on U ′, the number of total users
|U ′j | = nj and the secret sharing threshold tj are determined.
The legitimacy of selected users is verified by confirming
whether their signature for key distribution is valid.
Step 3. Secret Mask Collection: In the step, the
secret masks for masking the sub-aggregation of the
first-order and second-order gradients are generated. The
masks are random shares of the mask key from dif-
ferent users. Each user generates random shares of its
own mask key by computing {(u, ζsku,v)|v ∈ U ′j} ←
SS.share(〈sk〉priu , t, n) and sends them to the correspond-
ing user v in the encrypted format. The random shares
between two users u and v are encrypted by cu,v ←
IDE.Enc(KEY.Agr (〈ek〉priu , 〈ek〉priv ), u||v||ζsku,v). Each user
computes IDE.Dec(KEY.Agr(〈ek〉priu , 〈ek〉priv ), cu,v) to ex-
tract ζskuv and build the mask value set Ru = {(v, ζsku,v)}v∈U ′j .
Step 4. Boosting: Assume that the feature set of the
training samples is Q = {α1, α2, ..., αq}. For boosting,
S randomly selects a sub-sample Q′ ⊂ Q, and invokes
SecFind(Q′,U ′, E{(u,Ru)}u∈U0) to find the optimal split.
The implementation detail of SecFind is given in Sec-
tion IV-C. To build a new boosting tree with an optimal struc-
ture, S has to successively operate the boosting process until
the current tree depth reaches dmax or other termination condi-
tions [16] are met. Finally, SecBoost the newly fulfilled tree
as fκ. Moreover, each user updates the value of yˆ for the new
round of training after receiving the newly constructed CART.
For the privacy of both user data and training model, the
prediction is completed by invoking SecPred whose details
are given in Section IV-D. By repeatedly invoking SecBoost,
we can get a trained XGBoost model f(x) =
∑K
κ=1 fκ(x),
fκ ∈ K. Here, K is the naximum training round, and K is a
functional space corresponding to all possible CART.
Protocol 1 Federated Extreme Gradient Boosting Tree Build-
ing (SecBoost)
Input: A central server S, a set of users U = {u1, ..., uθ}
and a trusted third party T .
Output: A well-trained CART.
1: Step 1: S selects security parameter ppub ←KEY.Set(`)
and publishes the parameters for model training ppub, λ,
γ, l(·), dmax.
2: T generates signature key pair (〈k〉sigu , 〈k〉veru ) for u ∈ U ,
and operates T ⇒ U : (〈k〉sigu , 〈k〉veru ).
3: Step 2: ej ∈ E selects proper active user set U ′j , secret
sharing threshold tj and operates ej ⇒ U ′j : (U ′j , tj).
4: u ∈ U ′j invokes (〈sk〉priu , 〈sk〉pubu ) ← KEY.gen(ppub),
(〈ek〉priu , 〈ek〉pubu )←KEY.gen(ppub).
5: u⇒ ej ⇒ S: (u, 〈sk〉pubu , 〈ek〉pubu , σu ←SIG.Sign(〈k〉sigu ,
〈sk〉pubu ||〈ek〉pubu )).
6: E and S verify SIG.Verf(kveru , 〈sk〉pubu ||〈ek〉pubu , σu) =
1 and forward ej ⇒ U ′j : (u, 〈sk〉pubu , 〈ek〉pubu , σu).
7: Other users in U ′j verify whether SIG.Verf (kveru ,
〈sk〉pubu ||〈ek〉pubu , σu) = 1.
8: Step 3: u ∈ U ′j computes the shares of shared
key 〈sk〉priu by invoking {(u, ζsku,v)|v ∈ U ′j} ←
SS.share(〈sk〉priu , t, n).
9: u ⇒ ej ⇒ v : cu,v ←IDE.Enc(KEY.Agr(〈ek〉priu ,
〈ek〉priv ), u||v||ζsku,v).
10: u ∈ U ′j decrypts ζsku,v ←IDE.Dec(KEY.Agr(〈ek〉priu ,
〈ek〉priv ), cu,v), and collects Ru = {(v, ζskv,u)}v∈U ′j .
11: Step 4: S randomly selects a feature sub-sample Q′ from
full feature set Q.
12: S invokes SecFind(Q′,U ′, E , {(u,Ru)}u∈U ′) to deter-
mine the current optimal split.
13: Repeat Step 3 until reaching the termination condition.
C. Secure Split Finding
The most important operation in XGBoost is to optimize the
tree structure by finding the optimal split for each node of each
CART. For the centralized training method, XGBoost achieves
the split finding by simply sorting the feature values of training
sample, and then, traversing the values to find the optimal
split [16]. For FEDXGB, the training data are distributed
on different users. While applying the above optimal split
finding algorithm, it has to invoke SecCmp for multiple times
(e.g. O(nlogn) for quick-sort algorithm) to achieve the same
goal. Therefore, we propose a novel distributed split finding
algorithm, listed in Protocol 2.
To find an optimal split, SecFind takes as input all
candidate features A, the user set U , the edge server set
E , and the secret mask{(u,Ru)}u∈Ui , and then takes the
following steps. First, ej ∈ E informs the users in its domain
to upload their sub-aggregations of all first-order and second-
order gradients, gk and hk, mentioned in Eq.3. Each sub-
aggregation is masked with random shares of the mask key
ζsku,v and a random value ru, where u, v ∈ Uj . Then, ej
5Protocol 2 Secure Split Finding (SecFind)
Input: All candidate features A = {α1, α2, ..., αδ}, the user set U = {U1,U2, ...,Uθ}, the edge server set E , the secret mask
{(u,Ru)}u∈U1 , {(u,Ru)}u∈U2 , ..., {(u,Ru)}u∈Uθ .
Output: The optimal split for feature α and its score.
1: for 1 ≤ j ≤ θ do
2: Each u ∈ Uj generates a random value ru and its random shares {(u, ζru,v)|v ∈ Uj} ←SS.share(ru, t, n).
3: u⇒ ej ⇒ v : cu,v ←IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareu,v , u||v||ζru,v).
4: Each v ∈ Uj receives cu,v and decrypts ζru,v ←IDE.Dec(〈ek〉shareu,v , u||v||ζru,v).
5: end for
6: for 1 ≤ j ≤ θ do
7: u ∈ Uj extracts ζskv,u from Ru and computes ζHu ←
∑
1≤k≤|Du| hk + ru +
∑
v∈Uj ,u<v ζ
sk
u,v −
∑
v∈Uj ,u>v ζ
sk
v,u and
ζGu ←
∑
1≤k≤|Du| gk + ru +
∑
v∈Uj ,u<v ζ
sk
u,v −
∑
v∈Uj ,u>v ζ
sk
v,u.
8: u⇒ ej : cu,ej ←IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareu,ej , ζHu ||ζGu || {ζrv,u}v∈Uj ).
9: ej decrypts cu,ej and reconstructs ru =SS.Recon( {ζru,v}v∈Uj , t).
10: ej ⇒ S : Hj ← IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareej ,S ,
∑
u∈Uj (ζ
H
u − ru)), Gj ← IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareej ,S ,
∑
u∈Uj (ζ
G
u − ru)).
11: end for
12: S calculates H ←∑θj=1IDE.Dec(〈ek〉shareej ,S , Hj) and G←∑θj=1IDE.Dec(〈ek〉shareej ,S , Gj).
13: for 1 ≤ q ≤ δ do
14: S enumerates every possible candidate split Am{a1, a2, ..., am} for feature αq and publishes them to each user u ∈ U
through E .
15: u ∈ Uj computes ζH,Lu ←
∑
<ar,a∈Am hl + ru +
∑
v∈Uj ,u<v ζ
sk
u,v −
∑
v∈Uj ,u>v ζ
sk
v,u and ζ
G
u ←
∑
<ar,a∈Am gl + ru +∑
v∈Uj ,u<v ζ
sk
u,v −
∑
v∈Uj ,u>v ζ
sk
v,u.
16: u⇒ ej : cu,ej ←IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareu,ej , ζH,Lu ||ζG,Lu ).
17: ej ⇒ S : HLj ← IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareej ,S ,
∑
u∈Uj (ζ
H,L
u − ru)), GLj ← IDE.Enc(〈ek〉shareej ,S ,
∑
u∈Uj (ζ
G,L
u − ru)).
18: S: HL ←
∑θ
j=1IDE.Dec(〈ek〉shareej ,S , HLj ), HR = H − HL and GL ←
∑θ
j=1IDE.Dec(〈ek〉shareej ,S , GLj ), GR =
G−GL.
19: S then obtains score← max(score, G2LHL+λ +
G2R
HR+λ
− G2H+λ ).
20: end for
21: return the split with maximum score.
sums all masked sub-aggregations and transmits the result to
S in the encrypted format. Having the encrypted values from
edge servers E , S decrypts those values and computes the
aggregation result. For each given candidate feature αi ∈ A,
S finally selects all possible candidate splits and publishes
them to E and U . Next, SecFind repeats the above steps
to get the left-child node gradient sums for each candidate
split. The sum results are used to compute the score for
each candidate split according to Eq. 4. As the iteration is
terminated, SecFind outputs the split with maximum score.
The encryption and decryption keys in Protocol 2 are gen-
erated by invoking 〈ek〉shareej ,S ←KEY.Agr(〈ek〉priej , 〈ek〉priS ),
(〈ek〉priej , 〈ek〉pubej ) ←KEY.gen(ppub) and (〈ek〉priS , 〈ek〉pubS )← KEY.gen(ppub).
Score =
G2L
HL + λ
+
G2R
HR + λ
− G
2
H + λ
(4)
D. Model Privacy Protection with Secure Prediction
For existing federated learning schemes, an indispensable
operation is to refresh each user’s local model at the end
of each round of training [8]. The refreshed model is used
for obtaining prediction results to update the yˆk−1i in Eq. 1
that are essential to the next round of training. However,
users are honest-but-curious entities. They potentially steal the
model information to benifit themselves (e.g. sell the model
to the competitors of S). To prevent the privacy leakage, we
provide an optional security service in FEDXGB to protect the
privacy of models. Instead of transmitting the newly generated
CART model in plaintext, FEDXGB executes a lightweight
secret sharing protocol SecPred, presented in Protocol 3, to
proceed the prediction.
In SecPred, S takes a CART as input and U takes as input
the weights of leaf nodes in the CART. S and U secretly
and separately send the shared model parameters (optimal
split for each node) and user data to edge servers. Then, E
executes SecCmp and returns the comparison results to the
corresponding user. Finally, U decides the leaf node for each
sample based on the comparison results and collects prediction
results. In this way, we guarantee nodes of the CART are
unable to be accessed by U and E .
E. Robustness Against User Dropping Out.
In FEDXGB, the problem of user dropping out (UDO)
might happen during the model training process. It is cate-
gorized into the following three cases. The feasibility of the
countermeasures to UDO is based on the incremental learning,
an online learning method supported by XGBoost [16].
Case 1: A user u0 drops out at the Step 1 or Step 2
of Protocol 1. Thus, E cannot receive messages from u0
anymore. In such case, E just refuses u0 to be involved in
6Protocol 3 Secure Prediction for a CART (SecPred)
Input: S gets the thresholds for all split points of the input
CART {ϑ1, ϑ2, ..., ϑn}; U gets leaf node weights of the
input CART.
Output: The prediction result.
1: for 1 ≤ i ≤ n do
2: S computes {(e, ζ1e )|e ∈ E} ←SS.Share
(ϑi, tE , |E|) and sends them to the corresponding edge
server.
3: for each u ∈ U do
4: Select the feature values Ωu = {%1, %2, ...} corre-
sponding to ϑi.
5: Compute {(e, ζ2e,u)|e ∈ E} ← SS.Share (% ∈
Ωu, tE , |E|) and send to the corresponding edge server,
where % ∈ Ωu.
6: end for
7: E invokes SecCmp({(e, ζ1e )|e ∈ E}, {(e, ζ2e,u)|e ∈
E}) and forwards corresponding results to u.
8: end for
9: Based on the results, u ∈ U determines the leaf node and
obtain prediction results.
the current round of training and replaces the user by another
active user if possible.
Case 2: A user u0 drops out during the split find-
ing process. E recovers the secret mask of u0 by call-
ing SS.Recon and removes u0 from U ′ if u0 does not
reconnect before the next round of computation, that is,
U ′′ ⊆ U ′ and u0 ∈ (U ′ \ U ′′). To recover the secret
value of u0, E first collects the secret shares from at least
t users ζsku0,v ←IDE.Dec(〈ek〉sharev,ej , ζsku0,v), v ∈ U ′′. Then,
recover the mask of u0 through 〈sk〉priu0 ←SS.Recon({(v,
ζsku0,v)}v∈U ′′). Finally, by adding the recomputed shares of〈sk〉priu0 , the aggregation result for U ′′ is retrieved [17].
Case 3: A user u0 drops out at the prediction step. E directly
ignores the prediction request from u0 and removes u0 from
the active user set at the next round of training.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The FedXGB security is determined by three protocols,
SecFind and SecBoost and SecPred. To prove their
security, we first give the formal definition of security for
secret sharing protocol Definition 2 [18] and an essential
theorem Theorem 1 proved to be secure in [14].
Definition 2. We say that a protocol pi is secure if there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator ξ that can generate
a view for the adversary A in the real world and the view is
computationally indistinguishable from its real view.
Theorem 1. The protocols SecCmp is secure in the honest-
but-curious security model.
Since the security of SecPred is only related to SecCmp,
we omit its security proof which has been given in [14]. The
security of SecFind and SecBoost is proved as follows.
Theorem 2. The protocol SecFind is secure in the honest-
but-curious security model.
proof. Denote the views of user and edge server as Vu =
{viewu1 , ..., viewuδ} and Ve = {viewe1 , ..., vieweθ}. From
the operation process of SecFind, we can derive viewej =
{ζHu , ζGu , Hj , Gj , A, ζH,Lu , ζG,Lu , HLj , GLj , ru, 〈ek〉shareu,S },
〈ek〉shareej ,S }, viewu = {ζHu , ζGu , ζsku,v, ζru,v, ru, A, ζH,Lu , ζG,Lu ,
〈ek〉shareu,S , 〈ek〉shareu,v } and viewS = {H,G,Hj , Gj , A,HL,
HR, H
L
j , H
R
j , GL, GR, G
L
j , G
R
j , score, 〈ek〉shareej ,S }, where
1 ≤ j ≤ θ, u ∈ Uj , v ∈ Uj and u 6= v. Based on Theorem
1, it can be discovered that, except the public parameter,
the elements belonging to viewuk , viewE and viewS are
all uniformly random shares. According to Shamir’s secret
sharing theory, the shares can be simulated by randomly
chosen values from Fp. Consequently, there exists a simulator
ξ that can generate indistinguishable simulated view from the
real view of SecFind. Then, it is derived that the protocol
is secure according to the Definition 1, and Theorem 2 is
hold. 
Theorem 3. The protocol SecBoost is secure in the honest-
but-curious security model.
proof. In the protocol SecBoost, the user and edge
server views denoted as Vu = {viewu1 , ..., viewun} and
Ve = {viewe1 , ..., vieweθ}. From the protocol definition,
only parts of users are selected for model training in
SecBoost. The views of unselected users are set to be
empty. The views of remaining users U ′ ⊆ U are viewuk =
{ksiguk , kveruk , skpriuk , skpubuk , ekpriuk , ekpubuk , σv, cv,uk ,Ruk , view′uk}.
And for the edge server and the cloud server, their views
are viewej = {kveruk , skpubej , ekpubej , σuk , cv,uk , view′ej} and
viewS = {kveruk , skpubuk , ekpubuk , σuk , cv,uk , view′S}, where
1 ≤ k ≤ δ, 1 ≤ j ≤ θ, uk ∈ U ′, v ∈ U ′. view′uk , view′ej
and view′S are the views generated by SecFind. Except the
cryptographic keys, ciphertext and signature which can be
treated as random values, the remaining elements of viewuk ,
viewej and viewS are all random shares as mentioned in
the security proof of Theorem 2. Thus, similarly, we can
derive that viewuk , viewej and viewS are simulatable for the
simulator ξ, and the simulated views cannot be distinguished
in polynomial time by the adversary. Based on Definition 1,
SecBoost is proved to be secure. 
Lemma 1. A protocol is perfectly simulatable if all its sub-
protocols are perfectly simulatable.
According to universal composibility theory given in Lemma
1 [19] and the above proofs, it is concluded that FedXGB
is simulatable. Based on the formal definition of security in
Definition 2, FedXGB is derived to be secure.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct several extensive experiments to
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of FEDXGB.
A. Experiment Configuration
Environment. We utilized an Ubuntu 16.04 desktop, with
an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7920HQ CPU @3.10GHz and
64.00GB of RAM, to serve as our central server. Additionally,
we set up ten desktops (Ubuntu 16.04) with an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @3.00GHz and 8.00GB of RAM. By
launching multiple processes, each of them simulates at most
two edge servers. We also deployed 50 standard BeagleBone
Black development boards, that runs Ubuntu 14.04, AM335
71GHz ARM and 512MB of RAM, to serve as crowdsensing
users. Each of them simulates at most 20 users. The programs
in the experiments are implemented in C++. OpenMP library
[20] is used to accelerate the concurrent operations.
Dataset. We collected two datasets commonly applied on
mobile apps, ADULT2 and MNIST3, which contain 48k in-
stances with 123 features and 70k instances with 784 features,
respectively. The dataset of ADULT is for adult income predic-
tion, i.e., binary classification, which provides 32k instances
are training data and 16k instances are for testing. The dataset
of MNIST is for handwriting digit classification, i.e., multiple
classification, which divides the instances into 60k for training
and 10k for testing.
Setup. We set up parameters in FEDXGB as, step size η =
0.3, minimum loss reduction γ = 0.1, regulation rate λ =
1.0, user number n = 300, maximum tree depth dmax =
3, and edge server number θ = 10. We used Elliptic-Curve
Diffie-Hellman [21] over the NIST P-256 curve, composed
with a SHA-256 hash, to fulfill key agreement,. Authenticated
encryption is operated by 128-bit AES-GCM [22]. Given each
dataset, we averagely assigned the instances to each user. User
dropout is assumed to occur every 10 rounds of boosting in our
experiment. that is, 0%, 10%, 20%, 30% of users are randomly
selected to be disconnected at each 10th round of training.
Meanwhile, the same number of replacements are rearranged
to substitute the lost users.
B. Effectiveness Analysis
To assess the effectiveness of FEDXGB, we computed the
classification accuracy and loss by comparing FEDXGB and
the non-federated XGBoost. The loss functions are the logistic
regression for ADULT and the softmax for MNIST. Fig. 3
presents the accuracy and loss of each round of training in
FEDXGB. More specific, Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) describe the
accuracy and loss of ADULT, and Fig. 3(c) and Fig. 3(d) show
the result of MNIST. Compared with XGBoost, FEDXGB only
introduces the accuracy loss with less than 1%. Consider the
user dropout rate increased from 0% to 30%, FEDXGB is
robust against the user changes during online training.
C. Efficiency Analysis
1) Theoretically Analysis: The theoretical analysis of com-
putation cost for SecBoost, SecFind and SecPred in
Table II. Represent |D| as the number of training instances.
The computation costs of each user, each edge server and the
central server for SecBoost are O(n/θ+(n/θ) ·δdmax|D|),
O(n/θ + (n/θ)2 · δdmax|D|) and O(n+ δθdmax). As shown
in Protocol 1, SecBoost has four steps. Since the system
setup stage can be operated offline, its computation and com-
munications cost are ignored. The remaining three steps are
divided into two parts. One part contains the second and third
steps. In the part, each user executes 2(n/θ) key agreement,
signature and encryption operations, which take O(n/θ) time.
Each edge server executes n/θ signature operations, which
2ADULT: https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/ cjlin/libsvmtools/datasets/binary.html
3MNIST: http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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(d) Loss with different user dropout
rates for MNIST.
Fig. 3. Accuracy and loss for each round of training in FEDXGB for ADULT
and MNIST
also take O(n/θ) time. The central server executes n signature
operations, which take O(n) time. The other part is composed
of dmax invocation of SecFind. And for SecFind, the
derivate aggregation is operated for δ times, which takes
O((n/θ)·δ|D|),O((n/θ)2·δ|D|) andO(δθ) time for each user,
each edge server and the central server. As for the SecPred,
it invokes dmax SecCmp, which takes O(|D|), O(dmax|D|)
and O(dmax) time.
2) Experiment Results: In order to further evaluate the
efficiency of FEDXGB, we then experiment with the runtime
and communication overhead under different user numbers and
edge server numbers as shown in Fig. 4. In the experiments,
we set |D| = 50K and δ = 100.
Number of Users. When the involved users increase, the
runtime for each user grows linearly, and inversely, the
communication overhead for each user decreases, shown in
Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b), respectively. The linear growth of
the runtime is caused by the incremental cost of user se-
lection and secret mask collection steps. And due to the
less samples distributed to each user, the communication
overhead for each user decreases. The user dropout rate
barely influences the runtime because the correlated active
user only need to transmit one secret sharing for secret mask
reconstruction. Considering the impact of the incremental
user number performed on each edge server, the runtime for
each edge server follows the quadratic growth, described in
Fig. 4(c). The data reconstruction for dropped users has the
main effect on the increase of the runtime cost. Nonetheless,
the communication overhead is barely influenced because only
a little overhead increment is caused for the secret mask
collection. The increase of client number can only bring a
little more secret mask transmission overhead, yet the higher
8TABLE II
COMPUTATION COST ANALYSIS FOR SECBOOST , SECFIND AND SECPRED
User Edge Server Central Server
SecBoost O(n/θ + (n/θ) · δdmax|D|) O(n/θ + (n/θ)2 · δdmax|D|) O(n+ δθdmax)
SecFind O(n/θ · δ|D|) O((n/θ)2 · δ|D|) O(δθ)
SecPred O(|D|) O(dmax|D|) O(dmax)
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Fig. 4. Efficiency Analysis with different numbers of users and edge servers.
TABLE III
PROTOCOL RUNTIME FOR DIFFERENT STAGES
Stage
RunTime (s)
User Edge Server Central Server
User Selection 0.285 1.112 3.288
Mask Collection 1.333 1.458 N.A.
Boosting 18.802 23.308 26.863
Secure Prediction 5.182 5.987 6.961
Total 25.602 31.865 37.112
user dropout always causes more time to reconstruct lost
data via the time-consuming Lagrange polynomials. Specially,
the central server deploys less computation tasks than edge
server, but has more runtime as illustrated in Fig.4(e). The
phenomenon is caused by the reason that the central server has
to wait for collecting every edge server’s response to continue
subsequent computation. The communication overhead plots
about central server are omitted, because, for central server,
its communication overhead is just the edge server number
multiplied the difference between the edge server overhead
and the user overhead.
Number of Edge Servers. When the involved edge servers
increase, the runtime cost for each user decreases, illustrated
in Fig. 4(f). Because the number of user in each domain
managed by each edge server reduces, the computational cost
of secret sharing also becomes less for each user. Similarly,
the runtime cost of each edge server decreases, Fig. 4(g) while
the computation of secret sharing assigned on each edge server
reduces. As more edge servers are involved for computation,
the communication overhead of each server decreases, shown
in Fig. 4(h). For each user, the communication overhead does
not have obvious change because the assigned instances are
static. And the cost of central server performs similar to
Fig. 4(e) with 300 users. Due to the space limitation, we omit
these two plots in this paper.
In Table III, we list the runtime cost of different stages in
FEDXGB. It indicates that the major overhead in FEDXGB is
caused by the boosting stage, namely, the optimal split finding
algorithm, because numerous loop operations are proceeded.
D. Defense Against User Data Reconstruction Attack
Reconstruction attack [6], [11] is one of the most com-
mon and effective attacks against federated learning. Based
on the generative adversarial networks (GAN), the attack
reconstructs user data by solving an optimization problem.
However, FEDXGB is protected against such GAN-based
9attack because the CART in FEDXGB partitions the input
space into discrete regions and the optimization problem is
unable to be resolved. In order to validate how well FEDXGB
is protected, we conducted two experiments by launching the
user data reconstruction (UDR) attack against the federated
learning approach [8] and FEDXGB. We use the dataset of
MNIST and the results are shown in Fig. 5.
The left column of Fig. 5 illustrates that the federated
learning approach is attacked successfully. The attacker (i.e.,
the central server), S , first collects the gradient aggregations
uploaded by the specific victim ∇Gv and other users ∇Gi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Based on ∇Gv and ∇Gi, the attacker derives
the representatives Xi of the victim by solving the optimiza-
tion problem Op = arg min ||∇Gv−∇Ggen||2 +Ωgen, where
Ωgen is a regularization item and ∇Ggen is the gradient of
Xi. Given Xi, GAN outputs almost identical images.
The right column of Fig. 5 presents the UDR attack
launched on FEDXGB. Suppose that ∇Gi is the gradient
aggregation obtained by an edge server ej , the attacker, ej , is
unable to solve the optimization problem Op. Because of the
discrete input, the optimizer can only advance towards random
directions and outputs images that looks like random noises.
And the gray-level frequency histograms in the last row of
Fig.5 further illustrate that, for FEDXGB, UDR can hardly fit
the features of original images.
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Fig. 5. Security of FedXGB against user data reconstruction attack
VII. RELATED WORK
Most of the existing privacy-preserving works for machine
learning are data driven and based traditional cryptographic
algorithms. For example, Q. Wang et al. [23] proposed a
privacy-preserving data mining model learning scheme for
canonical correlation analysis in cross-media retrieval system
garbled circuit. Z. Ma et al. [18] proposed a lightweight
ensemble classification learning framework for the universal
face recognition system by exploiting additive secret sharing.
Considering the wide applications of gradient boosting deci-
sion tree (GDBT) in data mining, L. Zhao et al. [10] utilized
the differential privacy technology to implement two novel
privacy-preserving schemes for classification and regression
tasks, respectively. And towards the patient’s medical data pri-
vacy protection in e-Health system, X. Liu in [24] advocated a
homomorphic encryption based scheme to implement privacy-
preserving reinforcement learning scheme for patient-centric
dynamic treatment regimes. Due to be data security driven, the
above four types of privacy-preserving schemes still have to
upload encrypted user data to central server and cause massive
extra communication overhead.
Therefore, the federated learning concept was proposed [8].
Howev r, up to now, there were only a few works that adapted
the architecture to propose practical schemes for applications
[25]. And most existing federated learning schemes still con-
centrated on the SGD based models. For example, considering
the limited bandwidth, precious storage and imperative privacy
problem in modern Internet of Things (IoT) environment,
S. Wang et al. provided a SGD based federated machine
learning architecture based on the edge nodes in [6]. For the
privacy-preserving machine learning model training in smart
vehicles, S. Sumudu et al. [26] proposed a federated learning
based novel joint transmit power and resource allocation
approach. And to avoid the adversary to analyze the hidden
information about user private data from the uploaded gradient
values, cryptographic methods were then added to the original
federated learning scheme for protecting gradients. B. Keith et
al. [17] designed a universal and practical model aggregation
scheme for mobile devices with secret sharing technology. In
[27], N. Richard et al. utilized the homomorphic encryption
to protect the uploaded gradients and designed an entity
resolution and federated learning framework.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving federated
extreme boosting learning framework for crowdsensing ap-
plications. For securely building classification and regression
forest in the extreme boosting way, we designed a series
of secret sharing based protocols. The protocols guaranteed
that the privacy of user data, learning gradients and model
parameters were simultaneously preserved during the model
training process of XGBoost. Moreover, comprehensive exper-
iments were operated to evaluate the performance of FedXGB.
Experiment results showed that, with FedXBG, we could let
massive crowdsensing users work together to efficiently train
a high-performance extreme boosting model with no need to
concern about data privacy leakage.
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